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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

Case No.
8053

EDGAR RONALD PENDERVILLE,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Responding to appellant's Statement of Facts, respondent says:
With exception to the reference to a sum of $1,500.00
allegedly paid by appellant to counsel, said reference being,
in our opinion, immaterial, we adopt what appellant has
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said in his brief, pages 1 through 13, to the final reported
answer to the court by Mr. Penderville, as being an accurate account of the happenings between court, counsel
and appellant on December 15th, 16th, 1952. As to what
appellant said to or told his counsel on December 17th,
1952, we are not informed from the record and, of course,
we shall not attempt to interject allegation hors the record
in rebuttal thereof. From the record of trial, it does appear that appellant did not again present his objection to
the court on December 17th at a session in chambers immediately preceding the trial or at any time thereafter (R.
64).
The record shows from the "Transcript of Proceedings:"
Aug. 1, 1952-Filed Complaint of Del Duncombe
charging defendant with the crime of Murder in the
first degree
Aug. 1, 1952-Warrant of arrest issued
Aug. 2, 1952-Warrant filed on return
Aug. 2, 1952-Defendant present without counsel. Defendant answered that Edgar Ronald Penderville is his true and correct name. Complaint read.
Defendant advised as to his right to counsel. On
motion of defendant, court ordered arraignment contin,ued to August 7 at 10:00 A. M. to enable defendant to employ counsel.
Aug. 7, 1952-Deft present with counsel Joe
McCarthy. Deft answered that Edgar Ronald Penderville is his true and correct name. Complaint
read. Court ordered hearing set for Sept. 18, 1952
at 10 :00 A. M. Deft. to be held without bail.
Aug. 21, 1952-Filed Motion
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Aug. 27, 1952-Defts. motion for State to furnish certain statements, documents, reports, photographs, and names of witnesses was argued by respective counsel and denied.
Sept. 15, 1952-Deft's motion for a continuance
was argued by deft's counsel and granted and Court
ordered hearing cont'd to Oct. 28, '52'-10 A. M.
Oct. 28, 1952-Deft. pr~sent with counsel for
hearing. Joyce Richardson was sworn as reporter.
Complaint read. Wm. Y. Tipton, James D. Anderson
and Reed M. Langford were sworn and examined
behalf State. States exhibits "A"-drawing, "B."7 photographs and "C"-11 photographs were
marked. Dr. Maurice J. Taylor, Catherine Smith~
Dr. Lyman W. Condie, Dr. Adolph M. Nielson, Tom
Coggle, Vern Coggle, Susan Eliason, Wm. J. Christensen, B. F. Ramano, A. J. Murray and D. F. Duncombe were sworn and examined behalf State. States
exhibit "D'J-Bed spread, "E"-brassiere, "F"pad, "G"-pillow and case, "H"-smock, "I"-slip
and "J"-sheet were marked. States exhibits A, B,
C, D, E, F, G, H, I, and J were offered and received
in evidence. State rests
Oct. 28, 1952-Court informed deft. of his right
to make a statement not under oath. Deft. waived
his right. Deft's. motion to dismiss complaint was
argued by respective counsel and denied. Deft. rests.
Court ordered defendant bound over to the District
Court for trial on the charge set forth in the complaint without bail (R. 2 and 3).
App~llant's

arraignment in the District Court was on
the 6th day of December, 1952 (R. 7).
To the witnesses: Adolph M. Neilsen, M. D.
Dr. Neilsen, Salt Lake City physician, testified that he
arrived at the Penderville apartment at approximately
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eleven o'clock p. m. on July 30th (R. 82) ; that at that time
he found the body of June Weiler Penderville there at the
apartment (R. 82); that he found her to be dead (R. 83).
The doctor then described the position, condition, etc., of
the cadaver, observing that there was blood in the nostrils
and mouth (R. 83); that he formed an opinion from his
examination as to the cause of death, that in his opinion
death occurred from internal violence or trauma to the
head and that the injuries he observed on the neck, eyes,
head and skull could not have been self-inflicted (R. 93,
94); that the nose was broken (R. 83, 88) that it would
take a fairly strong blow to cause such hemorrhaging as
had occurred ( R. 95) ; and, that the cause of death seemed
evident (R. 113).
Lyman W. Condie, M. D. Witness-(R. 116)
Dr. Condie testified that he was called to the Penderville apartment on July 30th for the purpose of attending
June Weiler Penderville in connection with the possibility ·
of her commitment to the Salt Lake County Hospital; that
he arrived at or about 5:15 p. m. and departed at 6 o'clock
p. m. ; that he administered seconal, a drug sedative, to Mrs.
Penderville; that both Mr. and Mrs. Penderville decided
that they did not want her to go-to the Salt Lake County
Hospital (R. 118, 119). He observed at that time that
Mrs. Penderville had some old contusions about the eyes
and cheeks and jaw (R. 120). The doctor thereafter testified that Attorney William Christensen called him at 9 :35
p. m. in the evening of the same day and that he again went
to the Penderville apartment in response to said call, arriving there at approximately 9:55 p. m. (R. 121); that,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5
as he entered the apartment Mr. Penderville said, "Hurry,
I think she still has a pulse." Upon conducting an examination the doctor opined that, at that time, Mrs. Penderville was dead (R. 121). Further testifying as to his examination of the body, he stated that the body had a different look than when he had last seen Mrs. Penderville
alive at 6 o'clock p. m. (R. 121), and that the contusions
about the eyes were considerably larger and the "* * *
skin in that area was a dark purple" (R. 122); that there
was blood in the nostrils and mouth (R. 123). On crossexamination, Dr. Condie testified generally as to treatment
and medications afforded Mrs. Penderville while she was
under his care with emphasis mainly to barbituates and the
cumulative effect thereof when taken with alcohol (R. 123128). Then, on re-opening for direct examination, the doctor testified that he attended Mrs. Penderville on July 27th
at which time he noted various contusions, and that she,
Mrs. Penderville, said, in the presence of the appellant,
"He hit me," (R. 130). It was the opinion of this witness,
as was that of Dr. Neilsen (R. 93, 94), that the injuries
and contusions he observed on the body of Mrs. Penderville
at and after 9:15p.m. on July 30th, were not self-inflicted
(R. 130).
Susan Eliason, Witness-(R. 138)
Miss Eliason testified that she heard a disturbance
and noises coming from the vicinity of the Penderville
apartment between the hours of 7 p. m. and 7 :25 p. m.
(the witness left the premises at that hour but the noise
had not ceased) on the 30th day of July; and that "I thought
they were making a lot of noise, and it made me mad, so
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I stamped my foot on the floor to quiet it" (R. 140). The
witness knew there were some cars in front of the apartment although she was not able to recall whether or not
the Penderville car was one of them (R. 146).
William J. Christensen, Witness-(R. 148)
This witness testified that he received a call from the
defendant at about fifteen minutes before 9 o'clock on the
evening of July 30th (R. 149), and that responding to said
call he went to the Penderville apartment arriving there
at around 9 p. m. or shortly before that time (R. 148,
149). That he remained at the apartment until approximately 1:45 o'clock a. m. of the morning of the 31st of
July ( R. 150) . In addition, on direct examination, the witness described what he then observed concerning Mrs. Penderville ; he did not then state whether she was alive or
dead.
On cross-examination, Mr. Christensen stated that upon
seeing the lady lying on the floor, his curiousity was
aroused (R. 151) ; that Mr. Penderville did not appear to
be particularly upset at the time the witness arrived on
the scene (R. 152) ; that he seemed perfectly rational,
not alarmed or fearful (R. 153) ; that the lady was alive
and breathing rather heavily (R. 153) ; that her condition
changed while he was there, about forty-five minutes after
other occurrences there, she discontinued breathing (R.
154). Mr. Penderville noted the change of condition first
and only then was he advised by Mr. Christensen to get a
doctor right away (R. 155). To this point in the examination of the witness, there had been nothing elicited from
this witness other than that the lady was lying on the floor
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and that no examination was made .of her (R. 149), and
nothing done pertaining to her with the sole exception of
ministrations with an ice pack (R. 162) until after the
arrival of Dr. Condie (R. 156, 164) ; the body was in the
same condition at the time the doctor arrived as at the time
the witness first arrived (R. 164). The objections by the
State as to "hearsay" and as to "proper cross-examination"
during the examination of the witness were sustained by
the Court.
G. J. Murray-Witness (R. 166)
Mr. Murray testified that he was the caretaker for the
apartments at 1012 Barbara Place (R. 166) ; that there
were thirty-nine apartments together with from two to
six motel rooms (R. 167). That he became acquainted
with the defendant on or about the first day of July and
that he rented Apartment No. 2 to the Pendervilles at that
time (R. 167). He described the location of that apartment
with relation to the office and the apartment which he
occupied (R. 168). The witness testified as to voices or
words he had heard emanating from the Penderville apartment during the month of July, that Mr. Penderville's voice
always seemed to be that of a demand of some kind and
that he heard it, after the first two or three days, every
day while they were there (R. 169, 170). This witness
then testified that he was either in his apartment or around
the building on the 30th day of July, all day (R. 170). He
then stated that he was familiar with the Penderville's
Cadillac automobile, that it was at the apartment all that
day, parked at a certain place and in a certain manner and
that it was still in the same place when the officers arrived
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(R. 170, 171). That during the day he did not see the defendant at any time and during the evening only when he
saw the defendant at the phone (R. 171, 172). The witness
testified that Mr. Penderville used the telephone numerous
times from 5 p. m. on and fixed the time of five o'clock as
being when he, the witness, went through the office to go
to his apartment (R. 172) ; at five-thirty o'clock "Because
I was eating my dinner" (R. 173) ; at seven-thirty because
the witness was listening to the television (R. 173, 174,
176, 177). The record does show some discrepancy in this
witness's testimony at the trial, as to the time of the telephone calls defendant made, with the witness's prior testimony at the preliminary hearing (R. 174); however, he
had given the matter more thought and concentration and
he had not talked to anyone about it (R. 175).
Delbert F. Duncombe-Witness
Officer Duncombe testifi.ed that he was called to investigate at 1012 Barbara Place on the night of July 30,
1952 (R. 177, 178); that he conducted the investigation
and directed the taking of pictures (R. 179). The witness
was fully examined as to his findings during the investigation and in the course thereof made reference to, and commented on, the pictures he had directed be taken. Chemical
analysis was not made of the spots or stains found within
the apartment nor of those on the appellant's clothing. On
voir dire the witness was asked by counsel for the defendant:
"Q. How can you tell an old blood spot from
a new blood spot.
"A. Well, they become dark and become hard,
coagulated.
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Would you repeat that?
"A. They become dark in color and kind of coagulate, kind of,-I can't explain it to you.
"Q.

"Q. But when a blood spot has dried, assuming
this is a blood spot, you can only tell the age of it by
your experience?
"A. Well, I would say that was somewhat
right. However, in talking to Mr. Penderville, he
alBo told me they were blood, * * *" (R. 181).

Upon the completion of the further examination of this
witness, the State rested (R. 200).
Motions were then presented for the defense (a) to
dismiss the case, (b) to dismiss the charge of first degree
murder, (c) to reduce the charge to murder in the second
degree, (d) to reduce the charge to voluntary manslaughter,
all of which were denied. The court reserved to the defense
the right to renew the motion to reduce the charge to murder
in the second degree upon the completion of the evidence
(R. 201, 202).
The defense opened (R. 203).
E. 'LeverI Barrett, M. D., Witness- (R. 203).
The witness prbffered testimony to the effect that the
decedent was a chronic alcoholic in 1949 (R. 204, 205) .
Jack Tedrow, M. D., Witness-(R. 205)
In the opinion of this witness, the decedent was a
chronic alcoholic and addicted to the use of barbituates
when he treated her in March and April of 1949 (R. 206).
The doctor stated that alcohol and barbituates have a cumu-
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Iative effect and that both of them affect the central nervous system (R. 207).
William D. O'Gorman, I\1. D., Witness- (R. 207)
The decedent had been a patient of this doctor during
the period from April to July, 1949 (R. 207). The doctor
thought that a person addicted to the use of alcohol and
the use of barbituates bleeds more easily than a person
who is not; that one so addicted would be more apt to
receive a fatal injury from a slighter blow than would a
person not so addicted (R. 208, 209). The witness's remarks as to effect of combined use of alcohol and barbituates, quoted by appellant's counsel in their statement of
facts, was stricken as being immaterial and irrelevant to
the cause (R.' 208). The witness had never formed an
opinion as to whether the deceased would bleed more easily
than other persons (R. 210); he had made no tests as to
clotting time (R. 211).
Sidney E. Gilchrist, Witness- (R. 211)
This witness stated that he was director of laboratories
for the Salt Lake City ~ealth Department; that on or about
July 31, he tested the urine of the deceased to determine
alcoholic content.
Barton G. Clay, Witness-(R. 215)
Anna G. Robinson, Witness-(R. 220)
Cleo Porter, Witness-(R. 223)
Eva W. Shaw, Witness- (R. 232)
Clay, Robinson, Porter and Shaw were employees of
the Utah Liquor Commission and were called to establish
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the fact that defendant purchased two-fifths of Davis
County whiskey at State Store No. 3, Second. South and
Second East, Salt Lake City, on July 30, 1952. Efforts to
establish the exact or approximate time of the purchases
failed. Miss Porter made one sale and Defense Exhibit 3
indicates that -she was on duty July 30th from 3 :41 p. m.
to 6:03 p. m. and from 6:40 p. m. to 11:12 p. m.; Shaw
made the other sale and Defense Exhibit 5 shows her as
having worked on July 30th from 12:29 p. m. to 4:04 p.
m. and from 4 :32 p. m. to 7 :33 p. m. The numbers on the
cash register tapes corresponding with the numbers on the
sales cards show only that in each instance the purchases
were made during the above shift hours.
Fred M. Newson, Witness-(R. 234)
The witness testified that appellant in the company
of the deceased was in his place of business on July 30th
of this year (1952) "* * * possibly between ten thirty
and noon some time" (R. 235, 236).
Delbert F. Duncombe, Witnesss-(R. 237)
The officer, testifying as a witness for appellant, stated
that during his investigation of the case he discovered a
partially full bottle of Davis whiskey in the Penderville
apartment.
William J. Christensen, Witness-(R. 238)
Called as a witness for defense, Christensen presumed
that he was called to the Penderville apartment in a professional capacity as an attorney and he testified that the
subject matters of which he talked with defendant were
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(a) "* * * my inquiry about what was the matter and
about the lady on the floor" (R. 238) ; (b) "* * * in
connection with some advice he wanted as to marriage of
the lady being bigamous or not" (R. 239) ; (c) that he
had no conversation "relating to the subject matter of this
case" since the case did not exist then and there was no
chance to talk about something that did not exist (R. 239);
(d) concerning the subject of homicide but not until after
the plain clothes detectives had arrived and had questioned
appellant (R. 239, 240) .

•

Richard A. Call, M. D., Witness-(R. 240)
The doctor, a pathologist, testified at length as to
autopsies ; alcohol and seconal; Chemical analysis; hemorrhages ; trauma, black eyes; locomotion and loss of
control of bodily functions; hemorrhages, petechial and
subdural; hemorrhagic diseases; blood tests; liver functions; blows-small, light and heavy; skull fractures; stains
and spots; scratch marks and skin tests; blood types; age
of blood stains ; rigor mortis and body coloration after
death; bruises, chronic alcoholics and bleeding; hemophiliacs; the thickness of the average scalp and the age
of bruises. As to the deceased and as to the State's photographic exhibits of the cadaver, the witness testified:
"Q. You didn't know anything about June
Weiler Penderville?
"A. I heard the testimony.
"Q. You didn't know whether or not she would
bleed more readily than other people, do you?
"A. As a specific case, no.
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"Q. And that is because you haven't taken any
tests or didn't treat her before she died. Isn't that
true?
"A. I didn't take any test, no.
"Q.

.. A.

What is that?
I did not take any tests.

"Q. And the reason you can't tell about her as
a specific individual is because you didn't take any
tests?
"A. If tests had been taken, it would have been
able to determine that, though.
"Q. Now, it isn't your testimony that the condition of these eyes as you see it here is caused by
some kind of make-up or something of that kind, is
it?
"A. No, that isn't my testimony, but photography is notoriously deceiving.
"Q. And, of course, all we can do is take the
appearance of these photographs, Doctor, and does
it look to you like the condition reflected by these
was caused by trauma?
"A. Well, given adequate photographs and an
adequate examination, I could draw a much better
conclusion.
"Q. I am asking you from the photographs we
have at hand, sir. Does that appear to you to have
been caused by trauma?
"A. I would again have to know if these were
bruises or dried blood on the skin. The photograph
in and of itself is not helpful in the determination
of trauma.
"Q. Your testimony then is that from looking
at those pictures that you are unable to express an
opinion and tell us whether or not this body was
subjected to any trauma. Is that your testimony?
"A. No.
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Well, what is it then?
"A. 1 must qualify that a little bit and say if
the photographs are a true representation, then J
would agree that they do represent trauma.
"Q.

"Q. And assuming that an individual-and assuming again that they truly represent the condition
which existed, sir, and further assuming that the
scalp showed bruises and contusions and was thickened up to 1.3 centimeters, it looks like, in a few
areas due to the presence of edema and contusions,
would you say that such trauma could cause a massive subdural hematoma?
"A. It is possible.
· "Q. And from just taking the appearance of
the body there and assuming again the condition of
the scalp that I have indicated, that is the most
likely thing which would cause a subdural or a massive subdural hematoma if it were present in the
body which is indicated in the pictures?
"A. That is correct" (R. 266, 267, 268).

Edgar Ronald Penderville, Defendant-(R. 271286)

Defendant, in response to questioning as to his whereabouts between approximately six thirty and seven thirty
on the evening of July 30th, 1952, testified:
"A. I left the apartment I should judge approximately six forty-five. I drove downtown, went
to the liquor store at Second So11th and Second East,
made a purchase, and from there I drove west on
Second South and parked between First and-between State and Second East, State and Second East
-let's see-l'm not too familiar-Main and State
is where I parked and went across the street and
had something to eat.
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"Q. Do you recall the name of the place where
you ate?
"A. I'm not sure, but I believe that it's known
as the Pony Express Cafe.
"Q.

After you finished eating, what did you

"A.
272).

I returned to the car and drove home" ( R.

do?

Further testifying, he said: that when he arrived home
he found his wife lying on the floor along the wall; that
he lifted her out as best he could and her nose was bleeding; that he went to the bathroom and rinsed out a wash
cloth in cold water, bathed her face, went back and rinsed
the wash cloth out again and folded it over her forehead
(R. 272). Thereafter, he prepared an ice pack, noted her
right eye was swollen and he got the bed spread from the
bed and put it over her (R. 272, 273) . Then he said, "I
imagine ten or fifteen minutes after that I went down stairs
and called Mr. Christensen" (R. 273).
"Q. Do you know what time you made the
phone call for Mr. Christensen?
"A. No, I can't say precisely what time it was.
It was some time I imagine between quarter of
eight and quarter after eight. I have no way of
knowing exactly what time it was" (R. 273).

Mr. Christensen had testified that he received a call
from appellant at about fifteen minutes before nine o'clock
on the evening of July 30th (R. 149).
From the testimony as supported by the exhibits, it
appears that appellant did purchase two fifths of Davis
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County whiskey at State Store No. 3 on July 30th, 1952;
there remains a question as to the time of day for each
purchase (R. 287). Appellant was "not particularly" alarmed to find the deceased on the floor of the apartment (R.
288).
Defendant and appellant here on cross-examination
testified:
"Q. Doctor Condie left your place about six
o'clock that night, didn't he?
"A. I believe it was shortly after six, yes sir.
And do you know what time you left?
"A. I know it was after six because Doctor
Condie looked at his watch at one time while we
were talking in the living room and said, 'it is after
six o'clock. I have got to get home.'
"Q.

"Q. Well, but in connection with your leaving
the place, it could have been before six thirty that
you left. Isn't that true?
"A. I don't believe it was before six thirty, no.
"Q. Could it have been six thirty?
"A. It could have been-I guess it could have
been six thirty, but I don't believe it was.
"Q. As a matter of fact, you told the officers
that you had been gone about three quarters of an
hour. Is that how long you were gone?
"A. That would be my estimate" (R. 288, 289).

Testifying as to the deceased the witness said:
"Q.

"A.
"Q.

"A.

When you left, where was June?
June was on the bed.
Asleep ?
Asleep.
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"Q. And then when you returned, you say
that she was out of bed?
"A. She was out of bed, yes" (R. 290).

And,
"Q. She was bleeding from the nose, wasn't
she, when you got back?
"A. Yes, she was.
"Q. She was bleeding from the mouth when
you got back?
"A. No, she wasn't.
"Q.

"A.

Was there any blood in her mouth?
Not that I noticed.

"Q. Did you ever at any time during that evening notice any blood in her mouth?
"A. No, I didn't" ( R. 291).

Further,
"Q. And you say when you came back and
you looked at this body or this-June there-that
you were not particularly concerned. Is that right?
"A. Not at the time, no.

And you didn't call a doctor?
"A. Not right then, no.

"Q.

"Q.

lawyer?
"A.

The first person that you called was a
That's right" (R. 292).

Then,

"* * * after you returned, what was the
first phone call you made?
"A. I called Mr. Christensen.
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And you estimate that time as being what?
"A. I should say it was probably around eight
or eight fifteen.
"Q.

"Q. And you called him in connection with
the condition of June?
"A. Not particularly" (R. 292).

Also,
"Q. Now, you say that you-during this period
that Mr. Christensen was there June was breathing
very heavily, wasn't she?
"A. I wouldn't say very heavily. I would say
she was breathing audibly.
"Q. And it didn't particularly attract your attention the way she was breathing during this period of time?
"A. No. I was conscious of it, but it didn't
attract my attention.
"Q. And then all of a sudden she stopped
breathing. Is that it?
"A. I don't know whether it was all of a sudden.

Were you paying any attention to her?
"A. No. At that particular time I believe my
back was turned.
"Q.

"Q.

"A.
"Q.

"A.

And she was there prone on the floor?
She was lying on her back, yes.
Pillow under her at all?
No" (R. 293, 294).

Finally,
"Q. And you knew that she had been given sedatives by the doctor?
"A. Yes, I did.
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"Q.

"A.

And that they had put her to sleep?
Right" (R. 295).

Defendant on redirect examination testified :
"Q. Referring again to this liquor, I believe
-was the first fifth that you bought drunk by the
time you went downtown for the second fifth?
"A. It was gone.
"Q. How much liquor out of that bottle did
you drink?
"A. I had two mixed drinks, whiskey sours.
"Q. Now, out of the second bottle, did you have
any drinks out of that?
"A. I had some out of that after the inquisition started.
"Q. Did you have-were you the only one that
had a drink"A. As far as I know.

-out of that bottle?
"A. As far as I know. It was open and there.
I think it was opened about-well, it was after the
officers came that it was opened. I couldn't say the
time" (R. 295).
"Q.

And,
"Q.

"A.
"Q.

"A.

Did you ever have a serious head injury?
Yes. I have had a fractured skull.
When did you have this skull fracture?
March 1, 1951.

"Q. Since that time have you noticed any difference in your capacity to hold liquor?
"A. Definitely.
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"Q.

In what respect?
I can't take as much.
You can't take as much before you get

drunk?
"A.

In my opinion I don't get drunk" (R. 296).

"Q.

"A.

The witness had taken some paraldehyde during an
interview cond11:cted by the officers on July 31st, 1952, and
attributes to this his loss of memory as to what was then
said.
Elizabeth Ross, Witness-(R. 274).
The witness, called by the State, produced and
identified medical records from the files of the Latter-Day
Saints Hospital, Salt Lake City, Utah, pertaining to the
deceased.
Maurice J. Taylor, M. D., Witness-(R. 276).
The witness was called by the State, out of order of
trial, and testified of intermittant treatment afforded the
deceased by him from the month of August, 1949, through
June 3, 1952. The doctor testified as to tests conducted as
late as May and June of 1952 which did not indicate that
the deceased had a tendancy to bleed easily (R. 279); that
alcoholism in and of itself is not a cause of increased bleeding in the absence of severe liver damage (R. 279, 280).
The witness testified further as to an examination of the
deceased at the Newhouse Hotel on May 13, 1952 and as
to his findings thereon. On cross-examination the witness
stated that the deceased was not drunk all the time (R.
285) ; that for a period of some eighteen months, during
1949 and 1951, she was gainfully employed, not malnourished, and the picture of health (R. 286), that as late as
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June 3rd, 1952, the deceased was in quite good state of
physical health (R. 286).
Camilla M. Anderson, Psychiatrist, Witness(R. 298).

The witness testified she had examined the defendant
and that she was of the opinion that he had a limited capacity for alcohol and as to the manner in which he might be
affected by the taking of an ounce of paraldehyde. That
a person in an amnesic state produced from the taking of
paraldehyde would tend to tell the truth.
Delbert F. Duncombe, Witness-(R. 305).
Witness, a police officer, called by the State as a rebuttal witn'ess, testified as to a conversation with defendant
had on July 31st, 1952, during which defendant stated in
substance and effect that he returned to the apartment
about three quarters of an hour after having left there and
that that would make it at about seven or seven fifteen
o'clock; that, during the same conversation, defendant
stated that he was angry upon entering the apartment and
finding the deceased not in bed. The officer stated that defendant had been given some paraldehyde. On cross-examination, this witness stated that at the time of questioning the defendant was guessing at the time he left the
apartment or judging it by the time the doctor departed;
that "he stated that the doctor left, and he left immediately,
afterwards" (R. 306). Officer Duncombe further testified
as to how the defendant reacted after taking the paraldehyde, he had previously testified that the paraldehyde was
taken by defendant after the herein referred to statements
of defendant at the interview (R. 306).
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE RIGHTS OF APPELLANT AS GUARANTEED AND PROTECTED BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 12, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION,
AND SECTION 77-1-8, SUBPARAGRAPH 1,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, WERE
NEVER VIOLATED NOR WAS DUE PROCESS OF LAW DENIED APPELLANT IN
CONTRAVENTION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING ANY ONE OR ALL OF THE FOLLOWING
MOTIONS MADE BY DEFENDANT:
(a) Motion to Dismiss the Action at the Close of
the State's Case and Renewed at the Close of
Defendant's Case (R. 200, 309).
(b) Motion to Dismiss the Charge of First Degree
Murder at the Close of the State's Case and
Renewed at the Close of Defendant's Case (R.
200, 309).
(c) Motion to Reduce the Charge to Voluntary
Manslaughter Made at the Close of the State's
Case (R. 202).
(d) The Verdict is Contrary to the Law and the
Evidence, as- Raised in Defendant's Motion
for New Trial (R. 50-66).
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POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO ALLOW THE WITNESS WILLIAM
J. CHRISTENSEN TO TESTIFY AS TO THE
CONVERSATIONS HE HAD WITH DEFENDANT AT THE TIME JUNE PENDERVILLE
1NAS DYING ON THE FLOOR OF THE PENDERVILLE APARTMENT.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE RIGHTS OF APPELLANT AS GUARANTEED AND PROTECTED BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 12, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION,
AND SECTION 77-1-8, SUBPARAGRAPH 1,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, WERE
NEVER VIOLATED NOR WAS DUE PROCESS OF LAW DENIED APPELLANT IN
CONTRAVENTION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
"Strategy may not be resorted to in courts of justice
as is the case in war." Thus, this Court has spoken. Van
Cott et al., v. Wall, 53 Utah 282, 291, 178 P. 2d 42.
The "Transcript of Proceedings" speaks for itself.
Defendant was charged with the crime of murder in the
first degree on August 1st, 1952, and was not finally
arraigned in the District Court until the 6th day · of December, 1952. Continuances were had on motion of defend-
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ant and defendant was, in fact, continuously represented by
counsel from and after August 2nd, 1952. It may not be
said that defendant had insufficient time to prepare for
trial; nor can it be successfully contended that he was denied
the right to defend in person.
In the conduct of a criminal, the same as in a civil
jury trial, much ought necessarily be left to the good sense
and judgment of the judge. It is his duty to exercise a
sound discretion in all matters appertaining to the orderly
progress of the trial and during all stages of the proceeding
as well, and his action should not be interfered with unless
there is a clear abuse of discretion.
Defendant now contends that he was denied the right
to represent himself. The primary question is,. therefore,
did he want to do just that. We think not. In the reported
transcript of the discussion had between Judge Ellett and
the defendant on the day preceding the trial, defendant
said:
"* * * and as of now, I don't have one red
penny with which to employ another attorney, and
I won't have until the first of the month. However
I think I can get over that hurdle" (R. 321). * * *
Then:
"The Court: Well, do you want me to appoint
a lawyer for you?
"Mr. Penderville : I think I can make arrangements, or I should like after this incident-! should
certainly 'like to see three or four attorneys.
"The Court: I'm not going to do that. I will
tell you, because I think you are stalling on me, I
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will appoint a lawyer if you want to, or you can go
ahead with Mr. McCarthy, and it is immaterial to
me which you do" (R. 325).
True, the record thereafter shows that defendant said
he did not want Mr. McCarthy and it shows also that the
court proceeded to appoint him regardless of that fact.
However, the truth is that defendant did not seek to defend
himself in person and it is apparent from all of the discussion had that the court understood correctly that what
defendant actually desired was a further continuance. The
court's ruling was correct; see United States v. Maurice
Alvin Gutterman, 147 F. 2d 540, 157 A. L. R. 1221, (1945);
Annotated 1225. That court, confronted with a similar
if not identical problem, there said:
"As for the claim that the court unlawfully declined to dismiss the attorney who had been assigned
to defend him and was not shown to be unfaithful
or incompetent, it is in substance the same as the
contention that we held to be unfounded in United
States v. Mitchell (2 Cir.) 147 F. (2d) 1006, and
ld. (2 Cir.) 138 F. (2d) 831.
"There we had to deal with a defendant's contention that he was seeking to discharge his attorney
merely in order to exercise his right to conduct his
own defense, just as we have to do here. In neither
case did it appear that the defendant was really seeking to take over the personal conduct of his defense
or that he was doing more than to claim the privilege of changing his counsel because he did not approve of the latter's judgment. To yield to such a
request where the defendant has not made it clear
that he really wished to conduct the defense in propria persona gives far too great a chance to delay
trials and otherwise embarrass effective prosecution
of crime."
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In their brief, counsel for appellant say:
"As far as the record is concerned defendant
had never been involved in a felony prosecution.
This was an entirely new experience for him. Can
there be any greater prejudice shown than forcing
a defendant to trial with an attorney in whom he
has no confidence?"
We wonder if forcing him to defend himself, he being
so uns~illed in such matters and totally unlearned in the
law, would not have prejudiced his cause much more? We
think that the court was acting within its sound discretion
and that the record reveals a solicitude on the part of the
court for the cause of appellant's defense.
Where a solicitous trial judge advised a defendant
thusly:
"I think, as a matter of advice to the defendant
and for the protection of his rights, that this case
involves and will involve expert testimony; matters
that require more or less technical knowledge; also
technical knowledge on the part of counsel as to the
character of evidence, propounding of questions put
to expert witnesses; that requires a technical knowledge as to the manner of presenting such testimony
in court; that no person who is not familiar and
understands the propounding of those questions and
examining the experts is fully competent to represent the defendant, unless it is handled by counsel
who are familiar with that class of testimony to
some extent at least. Another thing that I want to
call to the defendant's attention is that if he has
counsel he has the privilege to request his counsel to
ask any question that he may desire him to ask of
any witness in the case, by communicating that
question to his counsel and his counsel putting the
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question to the witness, and if the question is a
proper one or one that is relevant to the issues in
the case, I believe that his counsel would and should
present the question to the witness and he would obtain all the results that he would obtain by putting
the question directly to the witness himself in person."
Thereafter, and despite such advice, the defendant
therein elected to personally conduct his own defense; on
appeal it was contended that the court's attitude and ruling
on the matter deprived the appellant of a constitutional
right to appear and defend in person and with counsel.
The appellate court found such contention to be without
merit. People v. Northcott, (Cal. 1930) 289 P. 634. In
that case the defendant intended to, elected to, and did
conduct his own case and the matter as to the right to a
continuance was not an issue.
The question of whether a continuance should be
granted or not rests within the discretion of the trial court
and will ordinarily not be reviewed :

State v. Freshwater, 30 Utah 442, 85 Pac. 447.
State v. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137, 148 Pac. 1071.
State v. Cano, 64 Utah 87, 228 Pac. 563.
State v. Fairclough, 86 Utah 326, 44 P. 2d 692.
State v. Williams, 49 Utah 320, 163 Pac. 1104.
State v. Hartman, 101 Utah 298, 119 P. 2d 112.
And, the refusal of a continuance will not be deemed
error unless there has been a plain abuse of discretion:

State v. Haworth, 24 Utah 398, 68 Pac. 165.
State v. Vacos, 40 Utah 169, 120 Pac. 497.
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State v. Riley, 41 Utah 225, 126 Pac. 294.
State v. Cano, supra.
State v. Fairclough, supra.
State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P. 2d 750.
See generally Decennial Digests, Criminal Law,
. Key No. 586 and Key No. 1151.
In the case of State v. Cano, supra, the time between
the preliminary hearing and the trial was only a little
more than thirty days ; in the instant case, the offense
charged was committed on the 30th day of July; the defendant was arraigned on August 2nd; thereafter successive
continuances were upon defendant's motion granted to August 7th, September 18th, and finally October 28th, in the
year 1952. Finally on the 17th day of December, 1952, the
trial commenced. The court said, in the Cano case, supra,
that it would be a travesty of justice to reverse a judgment
merely because one charged with a grave offense was speedily tried, and upon such trial convicted. Defendant here
complains of the "lower court's opinion" that defendant
was taking too long to prepare his defense. Section 77-24I
18, U. C. A. 1953, prov1"des:
"After his plea, the defendant shall be entitled
to at least two days to prepare for trial, but the time
of the trial shall not be postponed for a longer time
than the court may deem imperative."
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING ANY ONE OR ALL OF THE FOLLOWING
MOTIONS MADE BY DEFENDANT:
(a) Motion to Dismiss the Action at the Close of
the State's Case and Renewed at the Close of
Defendant's Case (R. 200, 309).
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(b) Motion to Dismiss the Charge of First Degree
Murder at the Close of the State's Case and
Renewed at the Close of Defendant's Case (R.
200, 309).
(c) Motion to Reduce the Charge to Voluntary
Manslaughter Made at the Close of the State's
Case (R. 202).
(d) The Verdict is Contrary to the Law and the
Evidence, as Raised in Defendant's Motion
for New Trial (R. 50-66).
Counsel for appellant says:
"We direct the following argument to all of the
foregoing motions. There is not a scintilla of evidence which directly or indirectly justifies the conclusion that defendant was the perpetrator of the
injuries sustained by the deceased on the 30th day of
July, 1952."
We submit that there was much more than a "scintilla"
of evidence both direct and indirect which fully justified
the jury (triers of the fact) to unanimously find that the
defendant inflicted the injuries causing death. We contend
further that these injuries could not have been self inflicted;
this contention is irrevocably sustained by the expert medical testimony adduced during the trial. We direct the
Court to the testimony of Adolph M. Neilsen, M. D., "the
iniuries he observed on the neck; eyes, head and skull could
not have been self inflicted" (R. 93-94); Lyman W. Condie,
M. D., "the iniuries and contusions he observed on the body.
of Mrs. Penderville at and after, 9:15 p. m. on July 30th,.
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were not self inflicted" (R. 130) ; there is no evidence the
injuries were self inflicted, or could have been self inflicted,
nor do the exhibits so indicate. Counsel interposes, and
contends, through some twenty pages of their brief, their
own theories on how the injuries could have been inflicted
and some of their theories are indeed not lacking in ingenuity. We think this argumentative approach would be
proper for presentation to the jury but that it has little,
if any, value or merit at this stage of the proceedings. It
would not be material for the respondent here to advance
a theory independent of the record. We are certain that
this Court will draw its conclusions from the contents of
the record.
To the motions and their merit. The motions complained of were made and disposed of as follows :
Record, page 200-202
"Mr. McCarthy: Comes now the defendant and
moves the court to dismiss the charge of first degree
murder for the reason that the prosecution has failed
to establish a prima facie case, in that there is no
showing of a criminal connection between the defendant and the charge, nor is there proof of the
corpus delicti. The evidence is inadequate to fix the
cause of death. There is no connection showing that
the defendant did the act.
"The Court: Well, I think there is a jury question here. The defendant was with the deceased so
far as the evidence goes-I think the jury now
could say he was with her all the time, and the evidence of the doctors is that she died, received her
death as a result of some trauma to the head, and I
believe that the jury could find that this defendant
was the cause of her death.
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"Mr. McCarthy: Your Honor, I see nothing in
the testimony that would rule out the possibility of
an accidental death, nor is there anything to directly connect the defendant with the place in which
the charged crime took place except negative testimony that no one saw him elsewhere, which does not
place the defendant on the scene at the time the
. crime is charged to have been committed.
"The Court: He's with her at the last anyone
saw her, and the first anyone saw her thereafter
he was with her. I think there is a jury question
involved. The n;totion will be denied.
"Mr. McCarthy: Now, Your Honor, I move to
dismiss the allegation of first degree murder and
ask that the charge on the present evidence be reduced to second degree murder because there is no
showing of premeditation, plan, design, or anything
else.
"The Court: Do you want to be heard on that?
"Mr. Roberts : Yes. I think there is, Your
Honor, I think the testimony indicates that this
woman was beaten and battered in the head. N umerous blows would have had to have caused the condition which appears on her scalp, on her eyes, and
the rest of her head and on the neck, and certainly
such a beating-evidence of such a beating would
indicate that the person who did it was intending
to cause the death.
"The Court: Let me ask, Mr. Roberts-you
don't need to take this.
" (Discussion)
"The Court: The motion at this time will be
denied. You may have the right to renew it upon
the completion of the evidence if you desire.
"Mr. McCarthy: I would like to go one further
and move that the charge be reduced to voluntary
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manslaughter because there is a failure to show intent to kill.
"The Court: That motion, of course, would have
been taken care of"Mr. McCarthy : On the denial.
"The Court : Of the first one, yes, and it is denied."
Record, page 309
"The Court : We are out of the presence of the
jury and in the presence of the defendant and counsel. You may make such motions as you desire, Mr.
McCarthy.
''Mr. McCarthy: Thank you, sir. Comes now
the defendant and moves the court to dismiss the
entire charge for failure of the State to prove the
case.
"The Court : That motion will be denied.
"Mr. McCarthy: Comes now the defendant and
moves the court to dismiss the charge of first degree murder for the reason that no premeditation
has been proved.
"The Court : I want to hear you on that. How
are you going to defend that?
"(Argument by Mr. Roberts)
"The Court : I will deny your motion and let
him argue it and see if they believe it." * * *
A motion to dismiss the charge "is properly denied as
where, according to various statements of the rule, the
evidence is sufficient to authorize conviction; where there
is substantial evidence to support a conviction, even though
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''t,

::

a conviction based thereon would be regarded as flagrantly
against the evidence; where there is any legal evidence,
however slight or weak and inconclusive, tending reasonably to show, or affording an inference of, guilt, or from
which the jury can legitimately deduce either of two conclusions; where the evidence of a material nature is conflicting, or presents a case for the jury, or is such that
reasonable minds might differ as to accused's guilt; where
the evidence tends to show the commission of the offense
charged and the connection of accused therewith, * * *
or is sufficient to overcome prima facie the presumption of
innocence, and to require accused to produce evidence in
his own behalf, or is such that, if believed by the jury, it
would support an inference or finding of guilt." 23 C. J.
S., Criminal Law, Section 1145 (3), page 665, et. seq.,
and cases there cited.
Commencing now with page 52 of Brief of Appellant,
and with the above rules in mind, permit us to analyze
(as we read them) the allegation, contention and conclusion of counsel for defendant as to what the record shows.
Dr. Condie was with the defendant and the now deceased
at their apartment between the approximate hours of 5:15
and 6:00 o'clock p. m. on the 30th day of July, 1952; he
consulted with them both and examined (at least by observation) and administered to Mrs. Penderville (R. 118,
119, 120); the dose of seconal which he gave her would
put an average individual to sleep without question (R.
120). When the doctor saw Mrs. Penderville next, at approximately 9:55p.m. on the same date, she was dead (R.
121). He had been re-called to the apartment by an at-
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torney, William Christens~n, and upon entering he was
told by defendant to "Hurry, I think she still has a pulse"
(R. 121). The body of Mrs. Penderville now had a different
look than it had had when he observed her when he last
saw her alive at 6 o'clock p. m. and coupled with the
abrasions and contusions thereon, there was blood in the
nostrils and mouth (R. 123). The State's photo exhibits
clearly show the extent of the abrasions, contusions and
injuries inflicted upon the body of Mrs. Penderville. Something gruesome and most unpleasant certainly happened
to her between the time of this physician's visits, i.e., 6
o'clock and 9:55 p. m. Since the defendant was with the
deceased the last anyone saw her and the first anyone saw
her thereafter, the evidence so far adduced was sufficient
to overcome prima facie the presumption of innocence and
to require defendant to produce evidence in his own behalf.
The witness, Dr. Condie, on cross examination testified
that he attended the deceased on July 27, 1952, (three days
prior to her demise) (R. 123, 124) ; on redirect examination the witness testified as to a conversation with the deceased on said July 27th during which various contusions
she had were being discussed, and she said "He hit me;"
to which defendant replied, "Oh, you were drunk and
stumbling about the room." Then while the doctor's examination continued and when defendant had left the room
deceased again said to this witness, "He did too hit me"
(R. 130). Is this evidence, such as, if believed by the jury,
would support an inference of guilt?
Counsel for defendant accepts the statements of the
witness, Susan Eliason, to be true and admits that something occurred in the Penderville apartment between 7 :00
and 7:25 o'clock p. m. The witness did not know when
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these noises or the disturbance ceased, it probably lasted
after 7 :25 o'clock but that is the time she left the building
and as long as she heard it (R. 140, 141). From the evidence so far, we, at this point, know something happened
to the deceased between the hours of 6:00 and 9:55 p. m.
and we know that at least between 7:00 and 7:25 p. m.,
there was a discernable disturbance within the Penderville
apartment. The jury could legitimately deduce from this
testimony, coupled with the later testimony of defendant,
either of two conclusions; the defendant was in the apartment or the defendant was not in the apartment at the time
the sounds described by this witness emanated therefrom.
Abandoning now the sequence of witnesses at the trial,
we go to the testimony of defendant as did appellant.
The defendant advances an alibi. He accounts for his
time as follows :
"Q. Calling your attention to the 30th of July
of this year, during the time interval between approximately six thirty and seven thirty of that evening, can you tell us where you were?
"A. I left the apartment I should judge approximately six forty-five. I drove downtown, went
· to the liquor store at Second South and Second East,
made a purchase, and from there I drove west on
Second South and parked between First and-between State and Second East, State and Second East
-let's see-I'm not too familiar-Main and State is
where I parked and went across the street and had
something to eat.
"Q. Do you recall the name of the place where
you ate?
"A. I am not sure, but I believe that it's known
as the Pony Express Cafe.
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"Q.

After you finished eating, what did you

"A.
272).

I returned to the car and drove home" (R.

do?

On direct examination the defendant. did not testify
as to the hour of his return to the apartment. On cross.
examination, he believed that it was shortly after six that
he had left the apartment (R. 288) ; he did not believe that
it was before six-thirty (R. 289). It was his estimate that
he was gone about three quarters of an hour (R. 289) . Dr.
Condie had testified that he had left the Penderville apartment at six o'clock (R. 120, 121). Defendant said he knew
it was after six because the doctor looked at his watch and
said, "it is after six o'clock, I have got to get home" (R.
288). Now, pinpointing time, if it be conceded that defendant left "shortly after six" and was gone about forty-five
minutes, it must have been somewhere near the hour of
seven when he returned. The disturbance was heard between seven and seven twenty..;five and probably continued
thereafter; we join with appellant's counsel and accept the
testimony of Susan Eliason as being true. Conceding, for
the sake of argument, but not admitting, we take the hour
of six forty-five as the time of defendant's departure-the
hour most favorable to defendant's cause and the one for
which he himself claims-then, again taking his accounting
of time-he would have returned to the apartment at seventhirty. Only five minutes after Susan Eliason departed,
· and the disturbance not hav~ng then ended. Conceivable,
but not probable, as we shall now see. Defendant has now
been heard to say that he arrived home at seven-thirty
o'clock; then he says that on his return he found his wife
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lying on the floor along the wall and that he administered
to her by bathing her face, preparing an ice pack and placing the bed spread over her. Then, "I imagine ten or
fifteen minutes after that I went downstairs and called
Mr. Christensen" (R. 273). That, says the defendant, was
sometime between a quarter of eight and a quarter after
eight! But, Mr. Christensen says he received the call
about fifteen minutes before nine o'clock and that he arrived at the apartment at around nine p. m., or shortly before that time (R. 148, 149). Dr. Condie returned to the
apartment at nine fifty-five. We know that something
happened to the deceased between the hours of 6 o'clock
and 9:55 p. m.; we know that it most probably happened
between 7 o'clock and 7:25 o'clock and thereafter. It appears to have happened and was over with before Lawyer
Christensen arrived on the scene at 9 o'clock or shortly
thereafter. We are sure that it was over with before 9:55
when Dr. Condie returned. What we do not know is where
was the defendant, accepting all of his testimony but again
not conceding the truth thereof, between a quarter of eight
or eight-fifteen when he said he called Christensen and
eight forty-five when Christensen said he was called. Could
the second bottle of whiskey have been purchased sometime
then? Could the defendant, from all of the evidence, direct,
indirect and circumstantial, have left the apartment after
seven-thirty and returned sometime before eight forty-five?
Is there evidence of a material nature conflicting, so as to
present a case for the jury, and such upon which reasonable minds might differ as to accused's guilt? We do not
hesitate to answer in the affirmative!

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

38

Possibly we need go on. The defendant says that when
he left the apartment the deceased was on the . bed and
asleep (R. 290). Dr. Condie had testified that he had administered to the deceased seconal in an amount that would
put an average individual to sleep without question (R.
290). The drug was administered during the doctor's first
visit and when he departed the deceased was evidently yet
awake, that was around six o'clock. Defendant says he left
the apartment sometime between shortly after six o'clock
and, again giving defendant the advantage, six forty-five
o'clock. If deceased was drugged and asleep at six fortyfive o'clock, what could have awakened her before the hour
of seven o'clock? Nowhere has it been made to appear that
anyone other than the defendant was seen at or near the
apartment of the deceased at or about the time deceased
sustained her injuries. Therefore, the jury was called upon
to adopt one of two premises; either the defendant inflicted
upon deceased her injuries, or they were self-inflicted. The
medical evidence was conclusive that those injuries could
not have been self-inflicted (R. 93, 94 and 130). There was
legal evidence, however slight or weak or inconclusive, tending reasonably to show, or affording an inference of, guilt,
from which the jury could legitimately have deduced either
of these two conclusions. In such case the motion to dismiss
was properly denied.
The defendant says that the deceased was bleeding
from the nose when he returned and administered to her
but that she was not bleeding from the mouth and that at
no time during the evening did he notice any blood in her
mouth (R. 291). The testimony of both Dr. Neilsen and
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Dr. Condie was that there was blood in the nostrils and
mouth (R. 83, 123). Here was evidence of a material
nature which was conflicting! Officer Duncombe was interrogated as to his knowledge of the age of the blood spots
and admitted that he could only tell from experience, however, the defendant knew the spots were blood and he told
the officer so (R. 181). To have known so, defendant must
have seen these spots made. Is that substantial evidence to
support a conviction, even though a conviction based thereon would be regarded as flagrantly against the evidence?
Is it evidence tending to show the commission of the offense charged and the connection of the accused therewith?
Not one but every test as to the proper denial of a motion
to dismiss has been, from the record in this case, squarely
met. When such competent evidence appears in the record,
there can be no error in failing to direct a verdict of
acquittal. State v. Peterson, (Utah 1952) 240 P. 2d 504.
If the court is dissatisfied with the weight and credibility
of the evidence, he may afterwards, upon that ground, set
aside the verdict and grant a new trial, but such is no
grounds for directing an acquittal. State v. Lewellyn,
71 Utah 331, 266 P. 261. The rule applicable when a motion
to dismiss challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence
was laid down by this Court in State v. '.(_hatcher, 108 Utah
63, 157 P. 2d 258, as follows :
"The rule which must be applied upon a motion
to dismiss a criminal case is that all reasonable inferences are to be taken in favor of the state, and
only if the record itself reveals that no reasonable
man could draw an inference of guilt therefrom is
the trial court justified in taking the case from the
jury."
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In applying the foregoing rule in this case, the tria
court could properly have done only what it did do i1
denying the motion to dismiss.
Appellant points to the testimony of Burton G. Clay
Anna G. Robinson, Cleo \Porter and Eva W. Shaw am
claims for this that it corroborates defendant's testimony
Nothing more was adduced from these witnesses other thar
the nature and scope of their employment, shift hours anc
the sale of two bottles of Davis County whiskey apparent!~
to the defendant during the time the liquor store was opeiJ
on July 30, 1952. The testimony of Anna G. Robinson went
for naught (R. 222). The time of the purchases ~annot be
determined even speculatively.
The witness Fred M. Newson could have and possibl;y
did see the defendant with the deceased at some time during
the morning of July 30, 1952 in his store (R. 235, 236). It
is not claimed that he saw defendant's Cadillac automobile.
Delbert F. Duncombe did find a partially full bottle
of Davis whiskey in defendant's apartment (R. 237). Onl;y
by inference can it be said that this was one of the bottles
supposedly purchased on July 30, 1952. We think that
immaterial, it does nothing to establish the time. of purchase.
William J. Christensen (R. 238, 239, 240). Called a~
a witness for defense, Christensen presumed that he wa~
called to the Penderville apartment in a professional capac·
ity as an attorney and he testified that the subject matter~
of which he talked with defendant were (a) "* * * m~
inquiry about what was the matter and about the lady or
the floor" (R. 238) ; (b) "* * * in connection witl
some advice he wanted as to marriage of the lady -bein~
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~.the~

, ."bigamous or not" (R. 239) ; (c) that he had no conversadiu'
' · tion "relating to the subject matter of this case" since the
case did not exist then and there was no chance to talk
~on G.~ about something that did not exist, (R. 239) ; (d) concern.' Shai! ing the subject of homicide but not until after the plain~~, clothes detectives had arrived and had questioned defend:~::.:::: ant (R. 239, 240). This witness had previously been called
-<::_ as a witness for the State. He had testified as to when
:- ;;;t~ he was called on the phone by defendant; when he arrived
:: -~ at the apartment of defendant; what he then observed of
:.:.-::~ the deceased and the defendant; what occurred while he
~.: :.::: was thereat. There was nothing in his testimony material
or otherwise as to what occurred before the hour of eight
forty-five p. m. on July 30, 1952, nor could there have
. -..... .....
been.
-:.

__
:.-..
-·

.:.;: :r
.-~

:-.. -~

. ,·
:c :aJ:

uon ~
~y~

G. J. Murray, State's witness, testified that he was the
caretaker for the apartments at 1012 Barbara Place (R.
166); that there were thirty-nine apartments together
with from two to six motel rooms (R. 167). That he became acquainted with the defendant on or about the first
day of July and that he rented Apartment No. 2 to the
Pendervilles at that time (R. 167). He described the location of that apartment with relation to the office and the
apartment which he occupied (R. 168) . The witness testified as to voices or words he had heard emanating from the
Penderville apartment during the month of July, that Mr.
Penderville's voice always seemed to be that of a demand
of some kind and that he heard it, after the first two or
three days, every day while they were there (R. 169, 170).
This witness then testified that he was either in his apart-
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ment or around the building on the 30th day of July, all
day (R. 170). He then stated that he was familiar with
the Penderville's Cadillac automobile, that it was at the
apartment all that day, parked at a certain place and in a
certain manner and that it was still in the same place
when the officers arrived (R. 170, 171). That during the
day he did not see the defendant at any time and during
the evening only when he saw the defendant at the phone
(R. 171, 172). The witness testified that Mr. Penderville
used the telephone numerous times from 5 p. m. on and fixed
the time of five o'clock as being when he, the witness, went
through the office to go to his apartment (R. 172); at five
thirty o'clock "Because I was eating my dinner" (R. 173);
at seven thirty because the witness was listening to the
television (R. 173, 174, 176, 177). The record does show
some discrepancy in this witness's testimony at the trial,
as to the time of the telephone calls Mr. Penderville made,
with the witness's prior testimony at the preliminary hearing (R. 174); however, he had given the matter more
thought and concentration and he had not talked to anyone
about it (R. 175).
The testimony of Mr. Murray as to what he heard or
observed as to the demeanor. and of the demegoric conversations between deceased and defendant was admissible
to show motive and probable cause for the assault upon
deceased by the defendant.
Counsel for appellant makes much ado about nothing
through pages 60 to 71 of his brief. It is said that defendant "did the normal and logical thing in rinsing out a washcloth in cold water, bathed her face and went back and
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rinsed the cloth out again and folded it over her forehead
and then put an ice pack on her head." We submit that it
would have also been the normal and logical thing for the
defendant to summon aid, if he had nothing to hide, for
the deceased. It certainly would have been the humane
thing to have done. Can it be said that a lawyer was summoned for benefit of the deceased? Finally, we make this
observation; that is, we cannot conceive that it could be
in any way material whether the deceased was an alcoholic,
a drug addict, a bleeder or in good health or in poor health
insofar as the question of homicide is concerned. If any
of these conditions existed, the defendant could not but
have known and would ordinarily have been expected to
respect the fact. He cannot blame his conduct upon a condition of intoxication, nor does he do so for he said, "In
my opinion I don't get drunk" (R. 296). Normally, those
unwell are able to command and to receive the greater attention because of that fact from all with whom they come
in contact in every segment of an understanding society.
The jurors brought in their verdict. It was, "We the Jurors
impaneled in the above .case, find the defendant guilty of
second degree murder, * * * "
We submit that there was substantial evidence from
which the jury could and did reasonably conclude that Edgar
Ronald Penderville fatally assaulted June Weiler Penderville and that being so, it is not the province of the appellate court to judge the sufficiency of the evidence; the
verdict should not be disturbed. State v. Aures, 102 Utah
113, 127 P. 2d 872.
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POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO ALLOW THE WITNESS WILLIAM
J. CHRISTENSEN TO TESTIFY AS TO THE
CONVERSATIONS HE HAD WITH DEFENDANT AT THE TIME JUNE PENDERVILLE
WAS DYING ON THE FLOOR OF THE PENVERVILLE APARTMENT.
Attorney Christensen arrived at the Penderville apartment approximately one and one-half hours after the witness Susan Eliason had heard the noises emanate therefrom. It was never contended that he perceived the infliction of the deceased's injuries; he, with the defendant,
between the hour of approximately nine o'clock p. m. and
nine fifty-five p. m., according to their own testimony,
calmly and meditatively discussed the affairs of defendant.
The Utah case, Jackson v. Utah Rapid Transit Co., 77 Utah
21, 290 P. 970, is certainly not for application to the factual
situation with which we are now concerned. The rule, as
to res gestae, is :
"The res gestae may include statements, acts
and conduct of accused after the commission of the
crime, whether such statements, acts, and conduct of
the accused are exculpating or incriminatory in
character or effect, but the statements or acts must
have been spontaneously made or performed while
the mind was still under the influence that governed
it at the time that the event took place, and at such
a time and place and under such circumstances as
to exclude the idea of design, fabrication, afterthought, or a mere retrospective narration of a past
occurrence." 22 C. J. S., Criminal Law, Sec. 667,
page 1054.
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Adopted by our Court in State
61 u. 359.

v. Gardner, 213 P. 794,

It was not erroneous to permit Christensen to testify

...

~·

!lid!!
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to those facts which he knew of his own knowledge. But,
the conversation he had with defendant sought to be elicited
had all the earmarks of a self serving purpose and was
therefore inadmissible. It was an attempt through heresay
evidence to show that defendant's story told at one time
would corroborate his story told at the trial and thus
strengthen his testimony before the jury. There was no
error in sustaining the objections.
See, State v. Seboldt, 65 Utah 204, 236 P. 225.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the judgment and conviction should
be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
E. R. CALLISTER,
Attorney General,
WALTER L. BUDGE,
Assistant Attorney General.
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